UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTR	ICT OF MINNESOTA
IN RE: TARGET CORPORATION CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BRE) N) Case No. 14-MD-2522(PAM/JJK) EACH)
LITIGATION)
)
This Document Relates to	
All Actions) 10:02 a.m.)
	ONORABLE PAUL A. MAGNUSON DISTRICT COURT JUDGE AND
MOTION TO	O DISMISS PROCEEDINGS
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1 PROCEEDINGS

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IN OPEN COURT

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Good morning, everybody.

ALL COUNSEL: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: We have the Target Consumer Case matter, Rule 12 Motion. Mr. McElhinny, do you want to proceed?

MR. McELHINNY: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, on my agenda I have four things that I want to accomplish this morning. One, I would like to answer any questions the Court has.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Pretty good for that size brief.

MR. McELHINNY: Well, I will just start with West Virginia. We can get into the details on West Virginia law.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Okay, tell me, what is West Virginia? Okay, go ahead.

MR. McELHINNY: Can I have that read back, please?

Obviously, I want to answer whatever questions the

Court has. Two, I want to talk a little bit about the

factual background as pleaded in the Complaint, because I

want to make sure that we are all -- we are in agreement

with the Plaintiffs on the facts, and I want to make sure we

are all in agreement.

Second, I want to address, take my chance to address the question, the first question you asked at the last hearing, which is: Is a motion to dismiss the right procedural approach to the issues that are before the Court today? And with my last remaining time I want to talk a little bit about standing and the Complaint as it is presently pleaded.

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So, with that introduction, at least until I hear questions from you, in the Plaintiff's Complaint, in Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 180, they plead the factual background as follows: Which is that there was a breach at Target, but as part of that breach, the hackers obtained access to two different kinds of information.

The first, which we've talked about, this credit card information. And as the Complaint alleges, the hackers were able to obtain credit card data as the card was being swiped in the point of sale machine. And we know that up to 40 million people may have been -- guests of Target, may have been impacted by that theft of credit card information.

In addition, but separately, we know that the hackers were able to get into a database that contained what I would call generally contact information. And that contact information as it is pleaded in the Complaint, again in Paragraphs 2 and 180, consisted of names, addresses, email addresses, contact information. And that database may

have affected up to 70 million people who have lost contact information. And there may be, and in fact likely is, some overlap between that 40 and 70 million number.

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So, in terms of the credit card financial, it is 40 million. In terms of names and addresses, it is 70 million, from a different database.

about, or two facts, are one: There is no allegation in the Complaint, and I am not sure there could be an allegation, that anyone's Social Security number was hacked from Target. There is no allegation in the Complaint that any guest gave their Social Security number to Target and there is no allegation in the Complaint that any Social Security number was taken from Target.

And finally, none of the Plaintiffs in the Complaint have alleged that they are one of the millions of people who received actual personal notice from Target telling them that it was likely that their information was taken. That is the factual background, that is the 40 and 70 million numbers that people have been playing with.

Second, then, I want to address why we think a motion to dismiss is the correct procedural device to address the Complaint as it is presently stated. We have submitted to Your Honor an opinion by Judge Nelson from last July, an opinion called *U.S. Hotel versus Onity*, O-n-i-t-y.

And in that case, Judge Nelson surveyed the evolution of what she calls the, quote, "lost data cases." And after doing the survey, the same cases that are before Your Honor, she concludes that the current state of the law is that most courts dealing with claims of these lost data cases dismissed those claims for lack of standing. That was Judge Nelson's conclusion.

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We also cited to you a decision, Sony Gaming by Judge Battaglia in San Diego, in which Judge Battaglia goes out of his way in his opinion to say that he thought it was appropriate to apply the Motion to Dismiss, the Pleading Rules with special emphasis in the data breach consumer cases. And that he thought it was appropriate to do that before he unleashed the expense and the burden and the time and the difficulty that is involved in these large class actions with, as in this case, 114 some Plaintiffs and 353 separate state claims.

So, as I was reading these cases, I was asking myself why is it that these Judges are coming to this conclusion that the motion to dismiss is the right time to start looking very carefully at these complaints? And I think my conclusion is I think there are three reasons why the Courts are coming to ground on this view.

The first of them is that common sense tells us that most of these claims are not and should not be

credible. And the reason for that is because we know that there is in existence, has been ever since we have been using credit cards, systems put in place by the banks and by contract, to ensure that the credit card user is not the person who bears the risk of loss.

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So, we have this system that, if it is working, makes sure that you or I when we use our credit cards, if something goes wrong there, we are not going to be the ones who pay.

And so, if that system has worked correctly in this case, common sense tells us that there should not be consumers who are injured. They are not supposed to get injured. So, that is the first reason, I think.

The second reason is these cases hold up huge risks of double recovery and multiple liability against Target. And Your Honor sees that. And Your Honor knows from the Financial Institutions Case that there is in place a contractual, through the card issuers and Target, a contractual basis for allocating risk and loss from these unauthorized transactions.

Your Honor also knows that in the Financial
Institutions Case, what we now have is classes of financial
institutions who are seeking to recover for those same
losses outside of that contract through direct tort and
their own individual claims. And that is what is preceding

the Financial Institutions Case.

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But, we are still talking about the same group of injuries, the same group of unauthorized charges, the same charges from replacing cards. And what we have here now is consumers who are seeking their own class action, but they are also seeking the same body of injuries. They are claiming the same injuries, the same expenses that the banks have already told you in the pleadings that they have paid for. That is one risk of double recovery.

The other risk of double recovery that we know about is we now know that the same time that the Target hack was going on, there were at least 40 other publicly-reported data breaches in progress in the United States. We know that J.P. Morgan has reported one. We know that Neiman Marcus reported one. We know American Express, Sears, even Goodwill Industries, all of those companies were being hacked at the same time that Target was being hacked.

But, there is nothing in the Complaint, of any of these complaints, that contributes their use of this credit card only to Target. There is no way to trace that charge, where their cards got hacked, because they haven't told us enough facts in the Complaint to tie their alleged injury to a Target breach, as opposed to any of these others that were going on at the same time. So, I think courts are concerned about this issue of multiple recovery.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Counsel, if you are going to even start to comply with Rule 1 or Rule 8 on a short plain statement, we have got 121 pages of a brief -- or of the Complaint here. It seems to me that you are pretty well placed on notice. I can't see why they should have to go down to individuals on these things.

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MR. McELHINNY: Let me finish up and get there, because I mean that's what I am -- I may not be doing it successfully, but I want to -- I'm trying to explain to Your Honor why other courts are in fact going beyond a short complaint and requiring Plaintiffs to actually prove the allegations that show that they have standing, that they have actually suffered an injury. And that is the standing test that an injury occurred. And to use, you know, the Supreme Court's language that it is fairly traceable to the breach that they are alleging.

And just the third point, Your Honor, about why courts are doing this is that these motions to dismiss in these data breach cases have been effective in reducing the cases. It turns out because of these reasons, because of the way the system works, that if you do put them to the test, they can't plead an actual injury. That is what has happened in all of these other cases that Judge Nelson surveyed when the courts didn't simply presume the facts necessary; but said, I want to see it in a pleading. The

end result is the cases go away because the injuries -- they are not supposed to be there, and at the end of the day they really aren't there.

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And Your Honor stole my punch line; that is Rule

1. I mean, the reason we have a motion to dismiss is

because if in fact the claims -- the injuries aren't real,

if they can't be traced to the breach, at the pleading stage

is the most efficient and it's the most effective and it is

the most cost effective way of producing a fair and accurate

result. And that is what is happening in all of the cases

that we cited to Your Honor.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Well, that isn't happening in all of them. There are lots of people that have data breach cases that disagree with the conclusion of Judge Nelson.

MR. McELHINNY: And I agree with that. That is her survey. I mean, Your Honor has read the cases. You will form your own conclusion. I am not going to tell you what the law is. But, it appears under Judge Nelson's conclusion that the way the courts are tending and trending is to this approach, particularly focusing on standing, and focusing on the tests that the Supreme Court has issued, and which --

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Well, you know, admittedly, these cases are hard; that's the bottom

line.

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And admittedly, I can understand both a damages argument and a standing argument as it relates to -- as it relates to a lot of potential people in one of these things. But, at the same token, we have pleadings here of people that have honest-to-goodness hurt. They have been injured by what happened.

Now, it is for another day whether or not that is Target's fault. But, we have allegations that people are honestly hurt. And for me to simply sit up here and say, well, there are people that are really hurt in this thing, but I don't think there is that much there, because the majority maybe don't have much there. That is not fair.

MR. McELHINNY: I don't disagree -- well, I don't disagree with the principle that Your Honor is putting -- I don't do this job -- I am not standing up in front of you to ask for injustice. That is not what I am here for. And I am not really here even yet to talk about whose fault any of this is.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: But you are here to say that these people don't have standing.

MR. McELHINNY: I am, Your Honor.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: And as you are saying that the people who are here don't have standing, you are essentially saying they don't have standing because they

weren't hurt.

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MR. McELHINNY: Well, let me turn directly -- I'm sorry, I don't mean to interrupt you.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: That's all right.

MR. McELHINNY: Let me turn directly to standing and be clear about what I am saying about standing, okay? First of all, there are some things that I think everybody agrees about, and here is one of them.

I think under the law, each one of the 114 named Plaintiffs has to allege facts that show that each one of those people has standing. So, in this motion, we challenge the standing of each of those 114 people.

So, it is not enough -- we will get to Your
Honor's point, but it is not enough that if there is one or
two -- if you look at the four that they like to talk about,
if Your Honor agrees with them about the four, that doesn't
say that the rest of those people -- each one of them has to
demonstrate standing on their own. That is Judge Anderson's
opinion in *Insulate SB*. The Court has to look at whether
each one of these Plaintiffs has standing.

And even then it would be significant if Your

Honor decided that only four of them had pled injury,

because in order to plead all of these state claims, they

have to have a resident from each of the various states.

And so, if we end up with only four, we end up with a much smaller lawsuit with many fewer claims; and, you know, an issue about standing until you decide it down the road.

But, it is important to look at each of these Plaintiffs individually, because that is what the law requires.

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And as Your Honor I think just pointed out, there is a broad -- each one of these alleged Plaintiffs have a completely different story, and the stories vary tremendously. Over half of the named Plaintiffs don't allege that they have ever had anyone try to do anything unusual with their account. Nothing has happened to their account. That is over half of the 114 people that they named. But those people, we submit, can't possibly have standing.

But, let me -- there is one issue that crosses everywhere. And it is not just the damages issue, but we think it is really important and we would hope that Your Honor does, as well, which is that in the Complaint, the Plaintiffs have defined the breach period as running from November 15th to December 15th. That is their definition of when the breach period.

And the only allegation that they make for each one of the Plaintiffs, is that that Plaintiff used his or her credit card sometime during the breach period. So, the only allegation that you have in the Complaint is that the

credit card was used sometime between November 15th and

December 15th. But, they also allege -- and I am not

arguing the facts with them, this is in their Complaint;

that the software, the malware that actually took credit

card information did not go into effect until November 30th.

So, we do not have an allegation from any of these

Plaintiffs that they used their credit card during the

period when the malware was in effect.

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An argument can be made -- I mean, you get to decide how you want to approach this, obviously. You can assume they meant it during the right time period, but I suggest that there's three reasons why you shouldn't do that.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Okay?

MR. McELHINNY: One, this is data breach case number 50. I mean, these Plaintiffs who are, you know, some of the best Plaintiffs in this line of work in the country know what they have to allege. And they didn't allege it here.

Two, they just filed a First Amended Complaint.

They just filed it on December 1st. They were holding our

Motion to Dismiss in their hands. They knew this issue

would be argued this morning. And they corrected one

problem, they got a South Carolina thing because they got a

South Carolina Plaintiff, but they did not fix this problem.

So --

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THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: I didn't -maybe I better back-up with you. I understood -- because I
quite honestly have not taken any serious look at that
Amended Complaint that came in -- that is, that they just
added a couple of Plaintiffs and everything else is the
same.

MR. McELHINNY: That is correct. But, my point is they added the Plaintiffs because they were trying to deal with this -- we need -- they wanted somebody to reach it, as well. I don't know, they didn't tell me why they added the Plaintiffs. But, they had that problem. We brought in somebody from South Carolina. But, they know that we were focused on this issue, as well, and they didn't fix this problem.

And third, we know that when they moved from the Original Complaint to the Consolidated Complaint, 156

Plaintiffs just simply disappeared. And what I suggest is, we are not at the beginning, here. I mean, this is not the first data breach case. It is not people who don't know what they are doing. I don't think it is burdensome -- what I think is not going to be important -- to require them to plead that if somebody is going to claim an injury from a data breach, that they used their card when the breach was happening. And you do not have that allegation from any of

the Plaintiffs in this case.

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THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Now, let me come back on this malware situation.

MR. McELHINNY: Yes, Your Honor?

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: It is my understanding that the Complaint is that people were using -- they used their credit cards. But, the malware comes into play because of Target Corporation -- the allegation is that Target Corporation retained a bunch of stuff that permitted that information to come in there.

MR. McELHINNY: I can give you the specific complaints, but I don't think I am going to have a dispute with Mr. Esades on this. But, the Financial Institution Cases make that allegation, but that is not what we are addressing here.

Here the question is, they allege that the hackers got into the system in November 15th. And between November 15th and November 30th, they did a bunch of things in the system that they needed to do in order to make the hack work. But, the hack, itself, this is in their Complaint as they allege it, didn't start until November 30th. So, no one who used a credit card before November 30th was influenced by the credit card stuff at all. Because they also allege that the theft from the credit card, happened as the card was being swiped in the machine, simultaneously.

In the Financial Institutions Case, Your Honor is right, that they then allege that the hackers took this information and stored it in the Target system before they exfiltrated it, and that is where they get their storage. But, there is no allegation that this system -- that the credit card information, as opposed to -- that is why I started with the contact database. The contact database was stored. But, that is just names, email addresses and phone numbers.

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The credit card information was not stored in the Target system. They took it in real time as the card was swiped. They then stored it before they exfiltrated it.

But, there is no way -- you can ask Mr. Esades this, but I don't think he is going to disagree with this. There is no way under the facts as alleged in the Complaint that anyone who used their card at Target prior to November 30th could have been impacted. Because the software that steals it didn't start until November 30th. And there was no prior credit card information stored at Target.

I'm sorry, I've got to make the salient point.

This is what they need to be proving. I mean, this is -- if they are going to plead an injury and make it directly traceable to the event, as Clapper says -- I mean, as Clapper says, you know, you couldn't assert a problem under a particular statute because you didn't know that was the statute that authorized the wiretap, you had to be able to

plead in order to challenge, which wiretap statute resulted in the issuance of the wiretap. That is the specificity of the allegation that is required. Here we are not asking for that.

For this part, we are just simply saying, let's start by limiting the class of Plaintiffs to people who actually used their credit cards, and for some reason the Plaintiffs refused to do that. They have the information. They knew it was challenged. They filed an Amended Complaint, they are not changing it.

And if these people that they named didn't use it, it obviously knocks them out of the case. How much time? Where am I?

THE CLERK: Fifteen minutes.

MR. McELHINNY: Left?

THE CLERK: Yes.

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MR. McELHINNY: Thank you. I am not going to waste your time and go through the rest of it. But, the other types of injuries they allege, spending money in order to avoid future fraud, even though they didn't have it, being without their cards for a week or two, all of these kinds of alleged injuries are ones that have been rejected by courts because they don't fit under the standing, they don't fit under the principle of allowing someone to generate their own standing.

But then to come back to the point, I don't know who Your Honor has in mind about people who actually suffered real injuries, but there are people who allege: I used my card, people attempted to make false charges -- I'm sorry, that reminds me of another point.

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None of the Plaintiffs alleges whether or not the false charges that were made were reimbursed by their banks. That failure to plead that has been held "failed" in three cases. The Plaintiffs know that. Again, they knew we were raising that point and they haven't corrected it, because they want to give the implication, although we know it can't be true, that somehow they paid those costs when in fact we know that they didn't. And requiring to allege that those charges were un-reimbursed will cut through whether or not we don't.

And then finally, there is a group of people, and I think this is who Your Honor -- who allege there were fraudulent charges made. I lost my card. And while I lost my card, I missed payments and I had to pay late fees.

But again, those people, even the ones who allege that kind of un-reimbursed expense, they don't allege who cancelled their card. Because if they cancelled their card, we are talking about a different kettle of fish here. The injury may be real, but whether or not they have a claim

that can go forward against Target, is not -- it can't.

Because it falls into this kettle of -- you know, some of
the people allege that they bought credit monitoring
insurance.

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Well, there are a bunch of cases that say you can't generate insurance by doing this. But, we also know that Target bought credit monitoring insurance for everybody in the world who wanted to sign up. So, whether or not — in order to discuss with Your Honor whether or not there is somebody here who suffered real injury, you really have to pick out a plaintiff and talk about that one particular person. And I can do that if Your Honor has a specific one.

So, the point -- just for the record, I was going to say we also briefed our 12(b)(6) motion that suggested 350 some individual state cause of actions. I am not going to take the time right now to discuss each of those unless Your Honor has a question about it.

I don't think you will be stunned to hear this. I don't think we are being unreasonable to say in a case this large, with 114 Plaintiffs, 353 causes of action, that the cost of which, the cost of defense of which is likely to be a factor higher than any possible recovery.

Given the fact that there has been so much history in these breach cases, and the courts have addressed them so thoroughly, we don't think it is unreasonable to require

these Plaintiffs to make the showing -- this is Your Honor's Rule 1 about the full notice.

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They have read Sony Gaming. They have read all of the cases from the Northern District of Illinois. They know what the courts are looking for. They don't have to guess about this. And we think it is fair. We don't think it is unreasonable. We think it is fair. We think it is efficient, we think it is good management, we think it is cost effective for Your Honor to simply say to these best lawyers in the world: You know what you have to plead. Give it to me in a complaint.

Thank you, Your Honor. I am going to save my remaining time for rebuttal.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Okay. There are two things here that I just want to mention to you. This is applicable to both sides. One is when you get into the negligence side, I am trying to figure out what states bar negligence recovery because of the Economic Loss Rule. Both of you talk about it, but I can't find the list of where it is.

MR. McELHINNY: I can resubmit -- we submitted an appendix --

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: You sure did and that was going to be my next statement to you.

MR. McELHINNY: I think we had permission to do

that.

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THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Oh, yeah, I am sure you did. But what I want to get to -- I want to get to that appendix business.

MR. McELHINNY: Yeah.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: And this is just looking at -- internally for us. I know that briefs are written because of these funny word limitations or page limitations. We have gone through all of those machinations over the years. And they are there for good reasons, because there are people in this world who will abuse it.

But, I have also said all of the time that good lawyers don't need rules. Bad lawyers don't follow them.

MR. McELHINNY: Yeah, but you are talking to the guy who is now on a timer because he was the second guy down the trail.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Okay. Now, what I actually was going to get to, in the future with respect to the briefing, you are going to get page limitation extensions all over the place from me. And know that, because just the very thing you have been arguing about all this time, just what we are involved in.

And it is really difficult to try to figure out as you read from briefing here, and then try to figure out

1 where we are in the appendix, the attachments, et cetera. 2 So, it is just a question for the future that -- go ahead, ask for the extensions, and if they don't give it to you, 3 4 call me. 5 MR. McELHINNY: Your Honor knows. You are the one who has to deal with all of this. We are in the business of 6 7 presenting it to you in the way that makes it the most 8 helpful to you. 9 THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: And I am not 10 critical of what happened, because what happened is kind of 11 a traditional way of doing it. But, I just happen to think 12 it is easier if you just read it in one stretch. 13 MR. McELHINNY: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: It's sort of 15 like my other forewarning, Judges don't read footnotes in 16 briefs, so -- thank you. 17 MR. McELHINNY: That is where all of the good 18 stuff is. Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Mr. Esades? 20 MR. ESADES: Good morning, Your Honor. Vincent 21 Esades for the concerned Plaintiffs. I think I will attempt 2.2 to follow Harold's organization at my own peril. I will not 23 be repetitive of the briefing and a lot of this ground was covered in the brief. 24

We are not here today because Target's systems

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were hacked. No system is hacker-proof. I think you see that reflected in some of the case law where claims are simply brought against companies where they have been hacked. We are here because of Target's conduct and the conduct that is detailed in the Complaint: The failure to stop it from happening; the ignoring of repeated warnings; and the failure to provide timely notice.

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And as a result of these things independent agencies, the DOJ, linked the fraud that was flooding the black market right back to Target, and came and told Target: You have been breached because we are seeing it all over the place. And it remains on the market.

Now, products and breach cases, it is interesting -- I understand that they want to have a discussion of sort of the evolving area of case law, and that is actually important, because they really fall in two camps when you read through privacy breach cases regardless of the time frame.

The first thing is that there is cases involving stolen data where there is no fact evidencing that it has actually been stolen, meaning -- sometimes we call it a laptop out of the back seat of a car type case, where data has been stolen, but there is no indication it has actually been accessed. And there is no actual evidence or facts plead, rather, that it has been misused. And also, those

cases, many of them, fail to allege very specific allegations as to damages.

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The other cases are where there is a coordinated cyber criminal theft of data and credit card information, where that data immediately is used and misused and continues to be misused.

And if you look at that simple factual differentiation, you will see the cases kind of cleave down the middle. So, doing a survey on them, what this tells me is there have been a lot of poorly-pled cases and a lot of cases where the data has never been misused or the allegations weren't there because the class reps that were litigating the class didn't have those allegations.

So, we turn to the facts of this case, which was Harold's, I believe his second point. The first point was questions which I am obviously available for. The second was facts, that 40 million may have been stolen.

Well, Target's own public disclosures told us that they actually were stolen. There is no allegation that this may have happened to these people. Everyone that used it during the breach period suffered the theft of the customer name, credit card data number, and the card's expiration date and CVV. That is from Target and that is in the Complaint.

Target also announced that the PIN data was

removed, as well, on December 27th. And on January 10th they announced the names, mailing addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses of an additional 70 million people were stolen.

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Now, with respect to that data, we have no temporal idea when that was given to them. As a result, we can't really be a hundred percent certain who the class members are. Target is in possession of that information. They are the ones that have it.

Harold referred to this as contact information. I think the more appropriate term is personally identifiable information. There is a reason the hackers stole it. They are not looking to send a mailer out to everyone. They use this information to commit identity fraud. And it is important to them and it is extremely valuable and this is sold on the internet.

Now, we didn't plead Social Security numbers were stolen. We don't know what any other data may have been stolen. We can only plead what we know at this point. And that goes to the second point, which I want to address right now, which is the issue of the timing.

Here is what we do know, we know that hackers gained access on November 15th. We don't know precisely what they were up to, but based on public reports that we have thus far, we know that they stole customer information,

credit card information.

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Now, discovery may come forward that shows us that it was only taken from a time period where the public documents would show that it was Black Friday, from that point on; but, we don't know that for sure. So, when we plead a complaint, we are not just taking information that has been gleaned from the public, probably we are a little bit cautious to be overly specific in a notice pleading.

Now, I can tell you that they will be able to depose, and they have already started to depose our class representative, who will tell them exactly when they made charges, exactly where else they used their cards, and exactly why they fairly traced their injury to the Target breach.

With respect to the survey of, one, why these cases get dismissed, I think it is important that, as I said, they turn on the facts of the case. And when you look at the facts that have been pled by the Plaintiffs in this case, we have a lot of specific examples of actual injury. And I would suggest that the multiple forms of injury that we have alleged across the board with each class representative cannot be compartmentalized and pull one out and attack it and pull the others out.

If you look at the allegations across the board, there were approximately 42 Plaintiffs who suffered

unauthorized charges and late paying fees. There were at least 57 who lost access to their own accounts for a period of time.

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Now, it doesn't matter who cancelled the card. If I use my card at Target, and Target tells me that card has been compromised, and I cancelled that, and I don't have access to funds -- because some of these accounts were linked to bank accounts, as you can see from the allegations. People lost access to funds they needed. Not everybody can weather the storm of a couple of weeks without money that they need. And it is a cognizable injury.

When Harold talks about -- when Mr. McElhinny talks about cases where these claims have been dismissed, they have been dismissed on standing grounds, which I have already addressed, which is that the class members in this case have already articulated this data was stolen, this data was misused.

If your data was misused, and one of the reps that they have already deposed right after he discovered the fraudulent charges, we don't buy credit monitoring before Target even offered it.

Now, Courts have held that that mitigation cost is absolutely recoverable in a case where you know it has been misused, or you know that the retailer has told you it has been stolen by criminals who intend to use it.

With respect to the double recovery argument, I was at the other hearing. I don't think anyone is arguing that we are asking for money that has been reimbursed to be paid a second time. To the extent reimbursements don't occur, and many of these late fees and un-reimbursed late fees from missing payments because there is no way to access accounts, we believe is recoverable; and that is not double recovery.

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And unless they are conceding that they are going to be reimbursing the banks, which I know from, based on the hearings, they have no intention of doing that -- they are still seeking to dismiss them -- there is no double recovery situation in any event.

When consumers are definitely not claiming the same injuries, you can look at paragraph 261 for the list of the ten specific injuries they are claiming and the each individual paragraphs from the Plaintiffs.

Now, with respect to the same time the Target breach was occurring, we are being told there were 40 other breaches. They can certainly bring those to light, but certainly the J.P. Morgan breach was not credit card information. There's no evidence that any of the information from the J.P. Morgan breach has been used by anyone or is in the hands -- some people suggested that that was just a foreign government showing that they could get

into our most protected institution, just to show they could breach them. But, it's nothing -- throwing up red herrings that there is other stuff going on in the world doesn't mean that our Plaintiffs haven't sufficiently pled that they used their card and that the card was compromised.

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That the Motions to Dismiss are effective in reducing cases, I think, is certainly true; that if you dismiss a case, there are less cases. It reduces the cases. I can't argue with that. But, I would argue that reducing the cases has certainly not made retailers take more attention and more care with respect to the process they are putting in place for security. And one of the reasons this case is going forward right now is that until retailers are held more accountable for lax security, that these cases will continue and dismissing them does not solve that problem.

Your Honor, I can address the negligence loss rule if you would like me to at this time.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: All I was really -- I think I understand the negligence -- the Economic Loss Rule. The problem I couldn't figure out is what states are you admitting that that's prohibited, versus what states it is not.

The subject was argued in your brief -MR. ESADES: Yeah, Target had --

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: But I didn't devise from attachments, et cetera, who, where -- and Counsel, I have got to tell you, I emphasize with you, because I empathize with myself trying to figure out these pigeonhole areas of law, and then to sit there and compare 50 states plus D.C.; that is not easy. I know that.

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MR. ESADES: It isn't. And I think both sides really attempted, and I think there was a real attempt to try and sift through those claims.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Well, there is no doubt about that.

MR. ESADES: And it did prove extremely difficult, because in some -- you know, taking the Economic Loss Rule as an example, there were 20 states that Target argued didn't permit the claim to go forward. Our argument to them was in every one of those states, and it is well-settled law in our opinion across the country where a claim is based on an independent duty, separate and apart from contract, independent of any contract you can go forward with a negligence claim.

Now, you will find cases that sort of inartfully apply this. But, if you dig down deep enough into the cases, and that is what we tried to show in our briefing on this; but, if you dig down deep, every one of those cases find that there is otherwise an independent duty. Separate

and apart from a contract, you can go forward with a negligence claim. And with respect to an independent duty, we have briefed that, and I won't get into the allegations on independent duty that is owed.

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I mean, even the *Sony* case that Harold has mentioned several times said that it is common sense that a retailer is going to owe a duty in negligence to someone who comes in and pays with a credit card; that they are going to have security measures and not allow that to be shared with a third party. And we have pled this independent duty in all of the states.

Your Honor, we attempted to -- you know, we are very careful in our pleading not to overstate when we didn't have the detailed enough facts, and to put in as much factual detail as we could given Rule 8. We did not plead every single class plaintiff in this claim.

I know that Mr. McElhinny mentioned that 156

Plaintiffs disappeared. You know, we are in front of the

Court. We also have an administrative duty to this Court to

try not to bring in 500 class representatives, if everyone

has got to worry about discovery and we have to worry about

collecting their documents. We simply tried to give it a

basic number, as broadly as we could.

And with respect to the standing argument, the standing argument that has been made by Target essentially

relates to, in our opinion, a class certification question.

And I will explain that. There is a difference between

Article III standing and class standing.

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And it is clear from the cases we cited that previous settlements have been done where there is one plaintiff for multiple states, that is a class question that gets sorted out when you decide who do you need, what is the claim going forward, and what class representative do you need from that particular state, if at all, because some can be grouped, and they are frequently grouped.

Now, they claim those are settlement classes and they don't count. But, settlement classes are no different than litigation classes except with respect to manageability. That is the only thing they don't have to be the same on. So, that is absolutely good law and continues to be done. But, if they have any arguments about the standing, there is nothing fundamentally unfair about applying those state laws to Target on behalf of those residents. If they want to make a class standing argument, we will have that debate when the parties have a chance to fully brief those issues on class certification.

Your Honor, I would just suggest that if you look at the individual class allegations for each one of the class representatives, and the overall allegations and injury, that these Plaintiffs have standing. And allowing

1 the case to go forward, that will allow them to prove their 2 damages in court, is the reason this motion should be 3 rejected. 4 THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Okay. 5 MR. ESADES: Thank you. THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: I thank you 6 7 very much. 8 Mr. McElhinny? 9 MR. McELHINNY: I am unclear on the rule here, 10 Judge. Do I get a new 40 minutes? In answer to Your 11 Honor's question --12 THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: I will go back 13 to the old statement: Good lawyers don't need rules. Bad 14 lawyers don't follow them. So, I don't know what category I 15 want to put you in. 16 MR. McELHINNY: In answer to Your Honor's 17 question, Appendix C to our opening brief, and then it was 18 repeated, I believe, in our reply brief. It deals with the 19 negligence law and goes state by state as to what the 20 Economic Loss Rule is, and it cites authorities for that. 21 In their opposition for the first time, the 2.2 Plaintiffs tried to get around this by alleging a special 23 relationship. We have dealt with that in our reply brief, 24 but we have also noted that they did not plead any special

relationships in their Complaint. So, that is the

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negligence issue.

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Let me note that in his time, Mr. Esades did not correct my statement to the Court. There is no disagreement that no credit card information was stolen prior to November 30th. In terms of what was in the 70 million, I refer you to paragraph 180 of their Complaint where they say approximately 70 million customer names, mailing addresses, phone numbers and email addresses were also stolen in the data breach.

In paragraph 152 is where they allege that the first credit card information was stolen on November 30th.

On this last standing issue, the question of whether or not you defer constitutional standing to the class certification was squarely addressed by Judge Anderson in the *Insulate SB* case where she points out that the courts that have done that have misread Supreme Court cases, and in fact individual constitutional standing should be decided on a 12(b)(1) motion. We cited that case to Your Honor.

In closing, I just want to make this point. The people around the Plaintiffs' table, and the 800 lawyers behind them are fabulous lawyers. And they are -- I may change my mind about this, but they are hugely ethical lawyers. And I want to say exactly what Mr. Esades just said, which is that they were extremely careful not to plead anything in this Complaint that they -- they didn't want to

be embarrassed, they didn't want to come in here and have pled stuff they couldn't prove. And so they were conservative and they pleaded what they could prove. And frankly, I applaud them for that.

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But, that is why you can do this motion, and it is why it so notable that they didn't plead that people used their cards after the malware started, because they don't know that. If they had known that, they would have pleaded it.

It is why it is so notable that they didn't plead that these charges were not reimbursed. Because if they could have pled that, that would have been a good fact for them; but, it is not in the Complaint. And so the facts of these various cases differ.

But, the concept, and Mr. Esades just said it to you. He said we don't know what information was stolen. We don't know how Target may have gotten some of this information. Discovery will answer those questions. But, that is where times have changed. This is a 12(b)(1) Standing Motion.

Plaintiff's have the burden of pleading and proving an injury, an actionable injury, or one that is certainly impending. And we have people here who -- it has now been over a year and no charges have ever been made to their account, and they have to be able to plead facts that

link it fairly traceable to the Target breach.

And what Mr. Esades just told you, honestly, was that you have in this Complaint the best they were able to do on the facts that they know. And under Judge Nelson's survey and where all of the other cases are, that that doesn't make it to 12(b)(1). Thank you.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Esades?

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MR. ESADES: Your Honor, I just want to be clear about the point that Mr. McElhinny was making about the use of the cards.

What I believe I said is I don't know when and how much information the hackers took after they gained access on November 15. And just to be candid, we vetted all of our class representatives with the idea of making sure that they used their cards during the exact time period where we absolutely knew. But, that is a different question than how you plead it, okay? And that is why I think we are having a little bit of disconnect right now.

We know the hackers got in by the 15th. And we know for sure based on what Target said by Black Friday they were taking them out. Maybe this isn't Target's statement but it's the public reports.

Virtually every class representative -- and there

1	may be a few exceptions, I don't want to say everybody, used
2	their card, Black Friday or after. And we didn't plead that
3	because we don't know for sure that there wasn't something
4	happening prior to that point when the hackers had access.
5	That is all I am saying is I don't know. And it would be
6	unfair to us to conclude that we should exclude people that
7	may have been impacted when we don't absolutely have those
8	facts. That is all. Thank you, Your Honor.
9	THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL MAGNUSON: Thank you very
10	much. Counsel, as usual, I will take it under advisement.
11	We will let you know as soon as we can. I will
12	step out for a minute and we will get another chair in here
13	and come back in for a status conference.
14	We do have some agendas here that I think
15	everybody got electronically, but in any circumstance,
16	Jackie, I will let you pass these out to people.
17	In a minute we will be right back in.
18	(Recess.)
19	(Whereupon the motion was adjourned. The status
20	conference followed and was prepared and filed under
21	separate cover.)
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5	I, Jeanne M. Anderson, certify that the foregoing
6	is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in
7	the above-entitled matter.
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10	Certified by: <u>s/ Jeanne M. Anderson</u> Jeanne M. Anderson, RMR-RPR
11	Official Court Reporter
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